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In this thesis, I explore the determinants of protests across 15 post-colonial
countries from 1990 to 2010. Specifically, I investigate the direct and mediating impact
of global economic dynamics and hardships experienced by populations in these
countries. To that end, I employ world systems theory as well as relative deprivation and
political opportunity theories. Analyses employ pooled-time series analysis based on
national-level data from the Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT),
as well as data from the World Bank and the Polity IV project, which provide insight
into the role of world systems dynamics on social unrest. Analyses demonstrate a strong
direct, yet nonlinear, impact of world systems indicators on levels of protest. In contrast,
the direct effect of hardships on protests suggests a more complex relationship. Male
labor force participation rate appears to be the only measure to partially mediate between
world systems indicators and protests. Importantly, I find evidence that the effects of
hardship indicators on protest are strongly non-linear. For example, while female labor
force participation was not significant in the full linear model, non-linear results indicate
a U-shape relationship with protests. While complex, results indicate global economic
indicators and hardships are predictive of protests, even after controlling for political
opportunities. These findings do not undermine political opportunity explanations,

however they do indicate research has underestimated the importance of quality of life
measures as a driver for protests.
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Introduction
When considering social unrest, a variety of events can be considered including, but not
limited to, riots, violence perpetrated by the state, and protests. While more specific than
social unrest, yet still broad in definition, protests function through a collective dissent
regarding certain issues that arise (Schrodt 2012). Protests are unique regarding whom
they target (e.g., government entities, religious groups) and whether or not violence
ensues. Explanations regarding the rise of protests have taken many forms over the past
six decades, with some scholars positing the rise is based in more psychological
phenomenon (Gurr 1970) and building to explanations regarding windows of opportunity
(McAdam 1982). While contemporary research focuses on how protests affect changes in
policy and other political outcomes (Amenta, Caen, Chiarello, and Su 2010),
explanations of how social unrest unfolds on a global scale have fallen short. In an
attempt to fill the void, this thesis asks under what conditions do social protests occur and
to what extent does global level economics and quality of life shape this relationship.
To better understand how global level dynamics and quality of life affect protests,
two major theoretical frameworks are employed, world systems theory and relative
deprivation theory. World systems theory focuses on global level dynamics; specifically
how international economic factors affect a number of different outcomes, including
protests (Smith and Weist 2012). Alternatively, relative deprivation theory uses
grievances (Gurr 1970; McVeigh 2009) and measures of national-level raw materials
(e.g., hardships) (Shefner, Rowland, and Pasdirtz 2015) to understand the rise of social
movement activity, such as protests. Contemporary social movement research focuses on
political opportunity explanations, however the development of political opportunity

5

focused on western industrialized democracies and research has focused on countries
with similar characteristics (Kitschelt 1986). Therefore, by reintroducing relative
deprivation concepts into social movement research, political opportunity measures are
controlled for. The approach of this thesis broadens the scope of countries in which these
relationships are generalizable, and tests the validity of both political opportunity
explanations and relative deprivation theory in a diverse sample of countries. Figure 1
depicts the theoretical model, indicating an understanding of how global level dynamics
shape protests directly, yet these global dynamics work through national-level hardships.
-------------Insert Figure 1 Here-------------By better understanding the conditions that spur protest events, research will
better validate and utilize political opportunity explanations, as well as relative
deprivation theory. Replication and generalization are cornerstones to research; therefore
this thesis provides insight into these necessary components. This not only benefits
research, but also helps inform future global level initiatives to decrease broad social
unrest. Understanding key predictors of protests helps to identify areas of focus for
organizations that seek to decrease unrest, and increase the global population’s quality of
life.

Historical Background
Major shifts in history have been shown to affect economics and hierarchical
power relations in a global context. The British Empire is one of the largest and longeststanding empires in recent history, whose impact continues to shape the world-economic
standing and politico-legal infrastructure of many countries around the world. Length and
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strength of colonial rule also affect the access to resources a country has, as well as its
position within the world economy (Ziltener and Kunzler 2013). Colonial rule was an
intricate mechanism in the formation of the capitalist world economy, influencing the
exploitation of poorer countries via countries that were more economically affluent and
militarily advanced at the time of colonization (Sanderson 2005). These well-established
effects of colonialism create a need to control for possible confounding historical
processes, which is done using a sample of countries that were historically part of the
British Empire, varying in timing of colonization and de-colonization.
While the legacy of British colonial rule has played an influential role in many
countries, the global economy also experienced dramatic shifts at the beginning, as well
as the end, of the Cold War. Over the course of the Cold War period, the integration of
countries into the global economy shifted with the declination of some major
superpowers (i.e., United States), influencing international trade and economics (Gaddis
1992). Some have argued that the end of the Cold War marked the decline of United
States global hegemony and the beginning of capitalism becoming a truly global
historical system (Wallerstein 1993). With the Cold War marking a shift in global
dynamics, this thesis focuses on the post-Cold War Era. Using a sample of countries with
a shared colonial history, I seek to explore how the modern world system helps to inform
the rise of protest.

Literature Review
World-Systems Theory
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World systems theory grew out of responses to modernization theories,
specifically their lack of consideration for structural factors in understanding how
countries transition from “traditional” to “modern” societies (Chirot and Hall 1982). It
postulates that the division of labor develops from a world-economic perspective where
capitalism perpetuates a global cycle of inequality, influencing multiple facets of
international relations. As industrialization spread, some countries developed quickly
therefore increasing their ability to engage in the world economy, however other
countries industrialized slowly exacerbating a rise in global power
hierarchies/inequalities (Olzak 1983; Amin 1993). Originally, world systems theory
classified countries as either part of the core, indicating a centralized governmental power
(strong government) and world-economic position, or as part of the periphery, affected by
exploitation of resources and labor, and lack of a strong government (Wallerstein 1974).
However, this original classification shifted with the introduction of semi-peripheral
countries into the theoretical framework, a technical term applied to countries that have a
combination of characteristics related to both core and peripheral countries (Wallerstein
1979). Semi-peripheral countries are unique in their position due to an overdevelopment
of government entities (i.e., strong government) compared to their economic position,
operating as a periphery country in terms of economic dependency on other countries for
supplies (Billings and Scott 1994). Countries rarely, yet do, transition from one category
to another, meaning these positions rarely change and offer limited mobility at the
national level. Limiting the capability for peripheral countries to move through the world
economy, core countries exploit peripheral countries’ cheap labor (Emmanuel 1972;
Raffer 1987); this limits the ability for peripheral countries to move through the ranks of
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the world economy or improve infrastructure (Petras and Brill 1986; Chase-Dunn and
Grimes 1995).
Theoretically, country categorization based off economic position is consistent,
however definitions of the “world-system” vary. Wallerstein (1974:347) defines the
world system as the, “territorial division of labor in which the production and exchange
of basic goods and raw materials is necessary for the everyday life of its inhabitants.”
Building on Wallerstein’s work, growth in world systems research has led to alternative
definitions. Frank and Gills (1993), for instance, define the world system as the transfer
or exchange of economic surplus as a fundamental criterion for participation in the global
economy. Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997:7), however, define the world system as
“intersocietal networks in which the interactions are important for the reproduction of
internal structures.” Chase-Dunn and Hall’s (1997) contribution introduces the notion
that local, regional, and national structures have interconnected relationships mirroring
the international world system. For the purpose of this thesis, I focus on the definition
provided by Wallerstein (1974), specifically the production and exchange of basic goods.
So how is world systems position related to protests? While the theoretical
classifications (core, periphery, and semi-periphery) are well-defined, multiple measures
have been used to conceptualize a country’s location in the world system. Gross National
Product (GNP) has been used as a measure of location due to its reflection of production
levels (Arrighi and Drangel 1986; Korzeniewicz and Martin 1994). Terlouw (1992) used
GNP, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and four other measures to gauge core and
peripheral locations in the world system. Generally, as a country’s GDP increases or their
economy experiences an exogenous shock (i.e., economic depression), levels of social
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unrest also increase (Holmes, Gutiérrez De Piñeres, and Curtin 2007). Economists,
however, have long used a measure of “terms of trade” to analyze engagement in the
world economy. Terms of trade represents a country’s ability to provide goods for others
(exportations) and self-supply instead of outsourcing for materials (importations)
(Svensson and Razin 1983; Idrisov, Ponomarev, and Sinelnikov-Murylev 2015). Easterly
et al. (1993) found that a country’s higher rate of exports to imports (terms of trade) was
associated with an increase in economic growth, such as increases in GDP. Although
there are no set measures of world systems dynamics, GDP and terms of trade tap into
central components of world systems theory regarding production and economic
capabilities.
World systems dynamics have the capability to shape not only economic growth,
but also socio-political outcomes. Scholars have established that known world systems
dynamics affect a range of outcomes, such as religious movement (Billings and Scott
1994), ethnic mobilization (Olzak 1983), anti-systemic movements (Arrighi, Hopkins,
Wallerstein, and Veechi 1989), and even austerity protests (Smith and Weist 2012;
Wallerstein 1990). Focusing on specific types of social unrest, however, prevents the
generalization of findings to a more global context. I seek to expand on the
aforementioned work by using a general measure of social unrest (e.g, protests) as the
outcome of interest. While research has shown a relationship between certain economic
predictors, specifically GDP, and social unrest, other measures of global level economics,
logically speaking, should follow a similar relationship. By employing multiple measures
of global level economics, I posit relationships should be similar to those observed
between GDP and socio-political outcomes. However, some research indicates that these
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positive relationships may actually be nonlinear, with semi-peripheral countries (i.e.,
countries whose status is in flux) experiencing disproportional rates of unrest (Kwon,
Reese, and Anatram 2008). It is here that I situate my first set of hypotheses.
H1a: Countries with higher GDP and higher terms of trade will be associated with
increased rates of social unrest.
H1b: The relationship between both world systems indicators (GDP and terms of
trade) and the outcome of interest will be nonlinear, specifically core and
periphery countries will be associated with decreased rates of social unrest.

Social Movement Theory
While world systems theory provides insight into the impact of economic
dynamics on protests, social movement theories offer a unique perspective on factors
beyond economics that affect protest activity. Social movement theories have shifted
focus over the past six decades from a more psychological, or grievance-based approach,
to the impact of politics, culture, and emotions on protest (McAdam 1982; Goodwin and
Jasper 1999; Polletta and Jasper 2001). Gurr’s (1970) relative deprivation theory focused
on the role of collectively experienced grievances, or the perception of a gap between
what a group believes they should have compared to others around them. Focusing on
feelings of economic deprivation, relative deprivation analyzes collective discontent
(Gurr 1968, 1970; Feierabend, Feierabend, and Gurr 1972). Relative deprivation scholars
have used political inequality (Moore 1978), rapid social change (Piven and Cloward
1977), and even inequality in land ownership (Muller and Sigelson 1987) to gauge
perceptual injustice and subsequent collective action events. Critics of relative
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deprivation theory have argued that the theory is too vague to be adequately tested
(Zimmermann 1983), that the perception of inequality is an assumed cause for collective
action (Jenkins and Parrow 1977; Oberschall 1993), and that overly psychological
applications of the theory make inaccurate assumptions about the causes of social unrest
(Snyder and Tilly 1972; Tilly 1975).
The 1970s critiques of relative deprivation theory led researchers towards a more
structural understanding of what causes collective action. Specifically, researchers began
to explore the role of social movement organizations (SMOs) gaining access to resources
allowing for successful collective action, also known as resource mobilization theory.
McCarthy and Zald (1973) find that increases in funding opportunities led to increased
protest activity in the 1960s. Similarly, other scholars established when SMOs for the
Farm Worker’s Movement experienced increases in funding; the movement experienced
increased success rates (Jenkins and Parrow 1977). Critics of resource mobilization
theory, however, state that it lacks generalizability to broader social movements because
most research using this frame has focused on specific movements and their outcomes
(McAdam 1982).
Since the 1980’s, political opportunity explanations, in many ways, have become
the reigning paradigm regarding contemporary social movement research. Scholars have
recognized the role of resources in developing collective action for many years (Gamson
1975), but more recently have stressed the importance of windows of opportunity in
political and cultural spheres (McAdam 1982; McAdam, Zald, and McCarthy 1996;
Tarrow 1998). The operationalization and explicit definition of political opportunities is
key to adequately utilizing theories of political opportunity (Meyer and Minkoff 2004;
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Meyer 2004). Tarrow (1995:19-20) posits that political opportunities are, “dimensions of
the political struggle that encourages people to engage in contentious politics”. While still
broadly defined, other scholars have operationalized political opportunities as support of
a movement through government allies (Faupel and Werum 2011), the declination of
major political parties (Tarrow 2011), as well as the shaping of social conditions to foster
protest emergence (Tarrow 1998).
Similarly, Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan’s (1992) political mediation model
critiques prior political opportunity research which focuses on movement organization
and action on social movement outcomes, positing political opportunity acts as a pivotal,
mediating factor of movement success. Direct effects of political opportunities are
foundational to political opportunity theory, however political mediation models suggest
SMOs and their actions are mediated through political context to achieve success (or
failure) (Soule and Olzak 2004; Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005). In recent decades,
scholarly fixation with political opportunities has meant that inequality as a cause of
mobilization/unrest has seen little attention (Snyder and Tilly 1972; Useem 1998).
Similarly, much international social movement research focuses on political opportunity
explanations (Moghadam and Gheytanchi 2010). For example, Kitschelt (1986) uses
comparative analysis to understand political opportunities and anti-nuclear movements.
Thus, it is here that I make a contribution with the current work.
Hardships, or deprivation of raw materials (i.e., employment and educational
opportunities), measure a previous theoretical framework regarding social movements
(relative deprivation theory). Only in recent years has social movement research seen a
resurgence of relative deprivation, refocusing on the role of inequalities as possible
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predictors. Van Dyke and Soule (2002) reintroduce grievances into social movement
research by understanding the role of group threat in the rise of militia groups in the
United States. Expanding upon this reintroduction, McVeigh (2009) finds that the
declination of economic affluence for urban, white individuals in the United States led to
increased numbers of, and protests by, the Ku Klux Klan and right-wing groups. Building
off of McVeigh’s (2009) call for grievances to be reintroduced, Shefner, Rowland, and
Pasdirtz (2015) posit hardships are related to increased protests rates in Latin America.
Measures of quality of life, such as hardships, are understood to increase the likelihood of
mobilization to occur (Goldstone 2002; Almeida 2003; Alimi 2009; Berry 2015),
however little research explores hardships as an explanative factor of mobilization.
While there has been some research on how quality of life measures, such as
employment, relate to protest, this measure is not the sole predictive factor. Expanding
past employment, I employ other quality of life measures to gauge hardships following
the same logic applied regarding employment rates and protests. It is here that I situate
the second set of hypotheses.
H2a: Countries with higher rates of hardships -- gauged in terms of labor force
participation, fertility rates, and population dynamics -- will be associated with
higher rates of protest.
H2b: The relationship between indicators of hardships and social unrest will be
nonlinear. Specifically, countries with moderate rates of hardships will be
associated with increased rates of social unrest.

World-Systems Theory, Relative Deprivation Theory, and Protest
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Combining world systems dynamics and the resurgence of relative deprivation in
social movement research, economics and hardships may work together to shape social
unrest levels. Shefner, Rowland, and Pasdirtz (2015) find evidence that long-term
indicators of economic and social inequality affect short-term indicators of economic
inequality as a causal relationship for social unrest. These findings tie together the
independent links between world systems theory and protests, as well as the proposed
relationship between relative deprivation and protests. I seek to take a similar approach,
proposing a mediation model, similar to what Amenta, Carruther, and Zylan’s (1992) did
regarding political mediation dynamics.
-------------Insert Figure 2 Here-------------In line with prior research, I propose that indicators of location within the world
system will be associated with protests (Wallerstein 1990; Holmes, Gutiérrez De Piñeres,
and Curtin 2007; Smith and Weist 2012), as well as measures of relative deprivation as
predictive of protests (McVeigh 2009; Shefner, Rowland, and Pasdirtz 2015). Scholars
have used similar models to understand world systems, inequality, and political violence
(Timberlake and Williams 1987). Additionally, I propose that national-level indicators of
world systems dynamics work through measures of relative deprivation to effect social
unrest. This deviates slightly from Shefner, Rowland, and Pasdirtz (2015) model, which
used a short-term hardships measure as a mediator for the relationship between a measure
for long-term hardships and austerity protests. Instead of employing one variable of longterm hardships and one-variable of short-term hardships, I use separate variables for
different categories, including economics and hardships. Figure 2 provides a visual
representation of the proposed theoretical model; this model seeks to understand how
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world systems measures (GDP and Terms of Trade) influence protests, and how
hardships (Male Labor Force, Female Labor Force, Adolescent Fertility Rate, and Urban
Population) act as potential mediating variables. It is here that I situate the third, and
final, hypothesis of this thesis.
H3: While the relationship between world systems indicators and protest will be
present, this relationship will be partially work through measures of hardships.

In this next section I address data collection and the variable selection process
employed to address each of the hypotheses indicated above. These data and methods
help to answer the linear and non-linear hypotheses posited in each theoretical section, as
well as the mediating relationship between world systems indicators and hardships.

Methods and Data
To explore which causal factors shape protest activity, I use multiple data sources with
aggregate measures for 15 countries that share a common colonial history. The sample
includes Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Egypt, Guyana, India, Kenya, New Zealand,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Trinidad and
Tobago. This sample of countries provides variation in timing of colonization and
independence from the British Empire, as well as variation in world systems indicators
and hardship measures.
Data on social unrest come from the Global Database of Events, Language, and
Tone (GDELT), a database that collects news sources from around the world including
local, regional, national, and international newspapers (GDELT 2016). Alternatively,
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databases of predictors of protests include: The World Bank, Polity IV, and the Integrated
Network for Societal Conflict Research’s (INSCR) Major Episodes of Political Violence
(MEPV). With consideration of other data sources, the World Bank provides
comprehensive data incorporating multiple outside sources (e.g., UNICEF, World Health
Organization). The World Bank also provides data on quality of life, economics, gender,
and other data of interest, while the Polity IV and INSCR’s MEPV provide government
and political indicators. The dataset constructed has a country by year format, with a
sample of 15 countries across 21 time points (1990-2010), yielding a total of 315
observations. There were few missing data problems regarding the variables due to
consistent collection of data and interpolation methods employed by the original sources.
I employ correlation and category-based multivariate analyses to effectively
determine predictors of protest. This process is conducted on economic variables that
represent the core foundations of world systems theory, as well as four categories of
variables to tap into hardships at a national scale: employment, health, population, and
political. One to two variables were chosen to represent each category of variables.
Variables
Dependent Variable: Protests
The outcome of interest is the number of protests reported per country in a given
year. Various events captured in the GDELT dataset are coded into 21 possible categories
of unrest. For the purpose of this thesis, I focus on events labeled “Protests”. The
criterion for protests includes events that are both violent and non-violent, which may or
may not be aimed at the government (GDELT 2016). While other types of social unrest
were considered by the GDELT and INSCR’s MEPV (unconventional mass violence,
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fighting, coup d’etats), protests represent a broad spectrum of events that can be both
violent and non-violent. To request these events, I utilize the GDELT Analysis Service
(http://analysis.gdeltproject.org/module-event-exporter.html). The total number of events
is summed by country and year to create a continuous variable of the number of reported
protests. To account for a non-normal distribution, the variable is logged, after adding 1
to prevent exclusion of original observations totaling zero.

World-Systems Indicators
The following variables are used to operationalize key concepts associated with
world systems theory, specifically world economic position and engagement in the world
economy, including domestic production and consumption.
Gross Domestic Product. Prior research has found that GDP and similar measures (GNP)
represent a country’s location in the world system (Arrighi and Drangel 1986; Terlouw
1992). GDP offers an aggregate measure of economics, and has been used as a proxy for
economic success and development of countries. GDP comes from the World Bank
dataset and defined as the value of production within a country in a given year (World
Bank 2016). Detailed descriptive statistics provide evidence of high skewness and
kurtosis, therefore this variable is logged to normalize the distribution.
Terms of Trade. Similar to GDP, terms of trade gauges the position of a country within
the world economy, especially a country’s engagement in the global economy (Taussig
1927; Svensson and Razin 1983; Findlay 1991; Idrisov, Ponomarev, and SinelnikovMurylev 2015). With exploitation as a key aspect of world systems theory, this variable
taps into a country’s ability to self-support and provide goods to other areas of the world,
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or whether a country may be more dependent on importations from other countries to
survive. Terms of trade is operationalized as the division of total exports of a country
within a given year by total imports of a country within a given year multiplied by 100. A
lower value on this variable represents a lower amount of exportations relative to
importations, while a higher value indicates higher amounts of exports relative to total
imports.

Hardships
In recent years relative deprivation explanations have gained momentum in social
movement research (Useem 1998; Van Dyke and Soule 2002; McVeigh 2009). Building
off of Shenfer, Rowland, and Pasdirtz (2015), I use aggregate level measures of
inequality, including access to resources and quality of life, to gauge hardships. These
hardship measures act as measures of relative deprivation.
Employment and Educational Opportunities. Employment and educational opportunities
represent a country’s quality of life by allowing assessment of residents’ abilities to
engage in a formal labor environment and provide for families. Formal labor market
participation rates are indicative of economic stability (Cerrutti 2000), therefore I employ
two measures of unemployment. First, I use the male paid labor force participation rate,
measured as the percentage of men in the work force relative to the entire male
population (15 and older). Similarly, the rate of employment for women in the paid labor
force relative to the entire female population is used (female labor force participation
rate). I hypothesize that both male labor force participation and female labor force
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participation will be associated with linear decreases in protests, as well as an inverted Ucurve non-linear relationship.
Health. To gauge overall health of a nation I use the adolescent fertility rate. Research
has established a link between adolescent fertility rates and international levels of
inequality, specifically a nation’s overall health (Lynch, Smith, Kaplan, and James 2000;
Pickett, Mookherjee, and Wilkinson 2005). The adolescent fertility rate measures the
percent of women (15-19) who report being pregnant or have children relative to the
entire female population that is pregnant or has children (World Bank 2016). I propose
adolescent fertility rate will be associated with a linear increase in protests, as well as an
inverted U-curve non-linear relationship.
Urban population. Dense urban populations signal areas of overcrowding, leading to
inequality of resources and poor quality of life (Camahan, Gove, and Galle 1974). This is
measured as the percent of people, relative to the entire population, who reside in an
urbanized area of the country (World Bank 2016). I hypothesize a linear increasing
relationship between urban population and protests, as well as an inverted-U curve nonlinear relationship.

Controls
The majority of research on determinants of protests has focused on the role of
political opportunities. Therefore to gauge the role of political and government power, I
include type of government, the presence of violence in a nation, and number of
individuals who served in the armed forces.
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Government Type. Government type influences the rates of unrest and national growth
(Gurr 1970; Kurzman, Werum, and Burkhart 2002). This measure was originally coded
from -10 (Full Autocracy) to 10 (Full Democracy) in the Polity IV data set. I rescale
government type to be 0 to 20, with increases in the scale representing a more democratic
government, to ease interpretation of results.
Armed Forces Personnel. Research suggests that the size of military personnel indicate a
state’s repressive power, specifically against collective action (McPhail and McCarthy
2005). Analyses include the total number of armed forces personnel a country reports in a
given year. Although considered, there was no consistently collected police force data to
my knowledge. Detailed descriptive statistics show evidence of high levels of skewness
and kurtosis regarding armed forces personnel. Due to evidence of a positive skew, the
variable has been logged to normalize the distribution.
State Violence. State violence is defined as the intensity of violence and warfare in a
country, available from INSCR’s Major Episodes of Political Violence. Presence of
conflict within a country has been shown to have effects on the level of trade (Morrow,
Siverson, and Tabares 1999) and social movement activity (della Porta 1995). INSCR
constructed this measure as the sum of ethnic violence, ethnic warfare, civil violence, and
civil warfare, ranging from no presence of state violence (0) to extreme intensity (40).

Analytic Strategy
I employ pooled-time series analysis with panel-corrected standard errors to
examine the relationship between world systems indicators, hardships, and protests.
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the proposed model. Due to the setup of the
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dataset and number of time points and observations, panel corrected standard errors are
preferred when using time-series cross-sectional data (Beck 2001; Garrett 1998). To
empirically determine whether a pooled-time series analysis is preferred over normal
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, I use the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier
(BPLM) to test the variance across observations (i.e., panel effects). Results indicate a
pooled-time series analysis is preferred over OLS regression (p<.001). Table 2 provides
the linear results of proposed independent variables. Model 1 introduces control
variables, Models 2 and 3 analyze the relationships between each of the proposed
theoretical frameworks, and Model 4 combines Models 2 and 3 to create a full model.
With a similar setup, Table 3 analyzes the non-linear relationships with the same setup as
Table 2. Results for these analyses are reported in percent changes, calculated from the
regression coefficient. With the logging of the outcome variable (protests), regression
coefficients are exponentiated, subtracted by 1, and then multiplied by 100 to determine
if an increase in the measure is associated with an X% increase in the percent of protests.
In order to test the proposed indirect effects on protests, Table 4 provides results
of world systems indicators predicting hardships. Each model represents a separate
outcome variable: male labor force participation, female labor force participation,
adolescent fertility rate, and percent residing in an urban area. For the purpose of
consistency, the control variables are used in each of these models as well. Sobel tests are
used to calculate the mediation effects via the world systems indicators relationship with
hardships and measures of hardships with protests in the full model (Table 2, Model 4)
(Preacher and Leonardelli 2016). Results of the Sobel tests are not reported here, but are
available upon request from the author.
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Results
-------Insert Table 1 Here----Correlation Matrix
Table 1 provides a correlation of all variables of interest. Due to the logging of
skewed variables, the correlation matrix reports variables post-transformation. GDP
moderately correlates (r>.40) with adolescent fertility rate (r=-.562), urban population
(r=.516), armed forces personnel (r=.643), and protests (r=.617). Armed forces personnel
moderately correlate with female labor force participation (r=-.551), state violence
(r=.509), and protests (r=.663). The adolescent fertility rate correlates moderately with
urban population (r=-.554). All other correlations between variables of interest fall below
a .30 correlation.
Correlation values higher than .5 are tested using a variance inflation factor (VIF)
to determine the presence of multicollinearity issues. These tests are done using ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression and post-estimation in Stata 13.1. Regressions are
conducted solely on variables with high correlations, as well as a full model regression
including all possible independent and confounding variables. All results indicate no
presence of multicollinearity, therefore all variables are used in the subsequent models.
---------Insert Table 2 Here------Linear Effects
Table 2 provides the effects of world systems indicators, measures of hardships,
and controls on protests. Results are discussed below in percentage change due to logging
of the dependent variable and some independent variables, based on the calculation
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discussed in the Analytic Strategy section. Model 1 analyzes the relationship between the
control variables and protests. It appears that for an every one percent increase in armed
forces personnel, a country experiences a 105.3% (β=.719, p<.001) increase in the
percent of protests. States with more democratic governments are associated with an
increase (β=.064, p<.001) in protest percentage. Contrarily, for an every one unit increase
in the level of civic violence, a country experiences a 4.74% (β=-.049, p<.05) decrease in
percentage of protests. All proposed control variables show significant effects in
predicting protests; therefore all will be used in Models 2 through 4.
Model 2 analyzes the relationship between world systems indicators (GDP and
Terms of Trade) and protests, controlling for possible political opportunities. A one
percent increase in a country’s reported GDP is associated with a 3.68% (β=.380, p<.001)
increase in percent of protests. A one unit increase in the terms of trade, however, is
associated with a decrease (β=-.010, p<.001) in the percent of protests. Model 3 analyzes
the relationship between variables representing hardships and protests. A one unit
increase in the male labor force participation rate is associated with a decrease of 7.21%
(β=-.075, p<.001) in the percent of protests, however a one unit increase in female labor
force participation is associated with a 2.36% (β=.023, p<.001) increase in the percent of
protests. There is a marginal decrease (p<.10) in the percent of protests as urban
population increases and no evidence of a significant relationship between adolescent
fertility rates and protests.
Model 4 combines world systems indicators, hardship measures, and controls to
understand the role of all variables and protests. Similar to Model 2, increasing GDP by
one percent is associated with an 8.10% (β=.817, p<.001) increase in percent of protests,
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yet a one unit increase in terms of trade is associated with a 1.66% (β=-.017, p<.001)
decrease in the percent of protests. Increasing the rate of male labor by one percent is
associated with a decrease (β=-.067, p<.001) in the percent of protests, and female labor
force participation is no longer a significant predictor of protest percentage. Contrary to
Model 2, a one unit increase in the adolescent fertility rate is associated with an increase
(β=.011, p<.001) in the percent of protests and as urban population increases, a one unit
increase is associated with a 1.10% (β=-.020, p<.001) decrease in the percent of protests.
Model 4 shows no evidence of armed forces personnel, civic violence, or government
type having a significant effect on protests, indicating a spurious relationship.
-----------Insert Table 3 Here---------Non-Linear Effects
While Table 2 provided results on the linear effects of the variables of interest on
protests, Table 3 analyzes the possible non-linear effects of world systems indicators,
hardships, and controls on protests. Model 1 provides results of the non-linear
relationships of the controls on protests. As armed forces personnel increase, as do the
percent of protests, however this reaches a point of diminishing return where protest
percentage begins to decrease as armed forces personnel increase (inverted-U curve). As
with armed forces personnel, civic violence follows the same relationship, reaching a
point of diminishing return. There seems to be no non-linear relationships between
government type and protests, according to Model 1.
Model 2 introduces world systems indicators into the model, along with controls.
Results indicate that there is no non-linear relationship between GDP and protests. On the
other hand, increases in terms of trade are associated with a decrease in protests, and as
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terms of trade reaches a certain point the percent of protests increases (U-curve). While
armed forces personnel does not seem to have a non-linear relationship in the model after
controlling for world systems indicators, civic violence continues to have a non-linear
relationship (inverted U-curve). However, as democracy level increases the percent of
protests initially increases but at a certain level of democracy protests begins to decline
(inverted U-curve).
Model 3 analyzes the possible non-linear relationships with the measures of
hardships and protests. Results indicate male labor force participation does not have a
non-linear relationship with protests. However, female labor force participation indicates
no significant relationship at lower values, yet begins to be associated with an increase in
protests at a certain point. The adolescent fertility rate shows no relationship in its lower
values but at a certain point begins to be associated with decreases in the percent of
protests. As the urban population increases, as do the percent of protests, however as the
percent of the population residing in an urban area reaches a certain point the percent of
protests begins to decrease (inverted U-curve). After introducing measures of relative
deprivation into the model, armed forces personnel and civic violence no longer hold
non-linear relationships, however government type continues to hold the same
relationship as Model 2 (inverted U-curve).
The full model (Model 4) analyzes the non-linear relationships between world
systems indicators, measures of hardships, and controls on protests. Similar to Model 2,
GDP does not have a non-linear relationship with the percent of protests, however terms
of trade only shows marginal significance (p<.10) of a non-linear relationship with
percent of protests. Female labor force participation indicates an initial decreasing
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relationship with percent of protests, however at a certain point the female labor force
participation begins to be associated with an increase in the percent of protests (U-curve).
The adolescent fertility rate no longer has a significant relationship with protests after
controlling for world systems indicators. Urban population continues to show an initial
increase as the percent of people in a country reside in urban areas and begins to decrease
at a certain point. Similar to Models 2 and 3, increases in democracy levels provide
evidence of a non-linear relationship with protests.
----------Insert Table 4 Here--------World-Systems and Relative Deprivation
Results provided in Table 4 indicate the relationship between world systems
indicators predicting the four concepts of hardships. Model 1 analyzes the relationship
between GDP and terms of trade on predicting male labor force participation. A one
percent increase in GDP is associated with a .21 (p<.01) increase in male labor force
participation, while a one unit increase in terms of trade is associated with a .06 (p<.001)
decrease in male labor force participation. Model 2 finds evidence that a one percent
increase in GDP is associated with a .70 (p<.001) decrease in female labor force
participation. An increase in terms of trade is associated with a .03 (p<.05) increase in
female labor force participation. Terms of trade is not a significant predictor adolescent
fertility rate, however an increase in GDP by one percent is associated with a 12.35
(p<.001) decrease in the adolescent fertility rate. Increases in GDP (β=6.91, p<.001) and
terms of trade (β=.06, p<.05) are both associated with an increase in the percent of the
population that resides in an urban area.
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Mediation Effects
To calculate the mediation effects of world systems indicators through measures
of hardships, I use Preacher and Leonardelli’s (2016) Sobel test calculator
(http://quantpsy.org/sobel/sobel.htm). Mediation results are calculated using regression
coefficients and standard errors of each hardships variable from Table 2 (Model 4), as
well as coefficients and standard errors from all models in Table 4. Results indicate a
partial mediating relationship between GDP and male labor force participation, as well as
a partial mediating relationship between terms of trade and male labor force participation.
Although there was evidence of a partial mediating relationship between GDP, as well as
terms of trade, and female labor force participation there is no evidence to support that
female labor force participation is predictive after controlling for GDP and terms of trade.
While world systems indicators are predictive of all hardship measures, there was no
evidence of a direct relationship between two predictors of hardships (adolescent fertility
rate and urban population) and protests prior to the introduction of world systems
indicators. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that mediation is present for adolescent
fertility rate and urban population, however there is evidence to support that a
suppression effect exists for female labor force participation.

Results Summary
Overall, there is at least partial support for all but one of the proposed hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1a proposes world systems indicators would show a positive linear
relationship with protests. Results indicate GDP provides a consistent positive
relationship with protests, however terms of trade consistently indicates a decreasing
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relationship with protests. Hypothesis 1b proposes the relationship between world
systems indicators and protests would be non-linear, specifically semi-periphery
countries would be associated with decreased rates of unrest. While GDP shows no nonlinear relationship with protests, the relationship between terms of trade and protests
indicates a U-shape relationship. The non-linear relationship between terms of trade and
protests is opposite of the hypothesized relationship.
Hypothesis 2a posits increased measures of hardships will be associated with
increased rates of protests. Results confirm that as hardships increase for 2 of the 4
measures there is an observed increase in protests. Hypothesis 2b proposes hardships will
have a non-linear relationship with protests, specifically an inverted-U shape. Findings
show evidence that female labor force participation and urban population have a nonlinear relationship with protests. Urban population’s finding is in the proposed direction,
however female labor force participation indicates that moderate employment rates of
females are associated with decreased rates of protests. Finally, Hypothesis 3 proposes
that world systems measures work through hardships to effect levels of protests. Sobel
tests for mediation indicate only one measure of hardships acts as a mediator, male labor
force participation, however there is evidence of mediating suppression effect for female
labor force participation. In this next section I discuss how these findings help inform a
variety of sources, as well as the limitations of the study.

Discussion
This thesis explores the relationship between world systems dynamics and hardships on
protests in a post-colonial context. It makes three main contributions:
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First, findings advance our contemporary understanding of social unrest
predictors, indicating a need to reconsider the role of hardships. Challenging prior
criticisms of hardships as an assumed reason for the rise of protests (Jenkins and Parrow
1977; Oberschall 1993), findings suggest including quality of life measures, such as
hardships, better inform predictors of protest activity. Model 1 in Tables 2 and 3 begin
with control variables, representing possible political opportunities. Regarding model fit
statistics (R2), linear models with only controls explain 47.6% of the variance, however
when hardships are introduced in Model 3 an 11.7% increase in variance explanation
occurs (R2=.593). Similarly in the non-linear models, the political opportunity models
explain 50.7% of the variance, but the introduction of hardships into the model increase
variance explanation to 68.1%, more than a 17% increase. Findings presented here do not
necessarily challenge political opportunity theory, however these findings do contribute
empirical evidence to the idea that collectively experienced hardships are strong
predictors of protest activity and quite possibly of social unrest at large. In line with prior
research (Useem 1998; Van Dyke and Soule 2002; McVeigh 2009; Shefner, Rowland,
and Pasdirtz 2015), I posit measures of hardships are explanatory measures of protests,
and should be reconsidered in future social movement research.
---------Insert Figure 3 Here---------Second, this thesis illustrates the importance of considering non-linear
relationships in our effort to predict protests. In line with Gurr’s (1970) inverted-U curve
hypothesis, multiple measures provide evidence of a non-linear relationship with protests.
Prior to introducing non-linear terms, female labor force participation rate and
government type indicated no relationship with protests in the full model (Model 4).
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Once a squared term was introduced there was evidence that these measures were
associated with significant, yet alternate, non-linear relationships. It is possible that
measures may have perfectly non-linear relationships with social unrest but the linear
terms will produce null results, as depicted in Figure 3. This advances the field
methodologically by indicating testing for non-linear relationships should be considered
and, at minimum, tested. Disregarding this possibility, as indicated in this study, may lead
researchers to falsely conclude there is no relationship present (Type II Error). While this
may be true for a post-colonial sample, these findings have the capability of being
generalizable at a global scale. Logically speaking, based off of Gurr’s (1970)
postulation, social unrest is complex and predictors of unrest cannot be assumed to act in
a linear fashion.
Third, by exploring the mediating relationship between world systems dynamics
and measures of hardships on protests, results suggest focusing solely on direct
relationships oversimplify explanations of protests. Consistently, world systems
indicators provide evidence of a direct relationship with protests. Calculations of Sobel
tests, however, provide support that global level economics work through national-level
measures of hardships to inform protest activity. The premise of world systems theory
indicates global level economics influence a number of different outcomes, which has
been concluded in the results. Table 4 indicates world systems measures affect all four
measures of hardships, and Table 2 indicates a direct relationship with protests.
Understanding how global level dynamics work to inform national-level quality of life,
such as hardships, allows observation of how global level economics shape populations’
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experiences. These experiences, such as rates of employment, in return help to shape
national-level social unrest.
While this thesis provides insight to multiple areas of social movement research,
it does not come without limitations. First, the data used are only at the national-level,
leaving little room to apply findings at disaggregate levels. It is possible that these
relationships may not manifest themselves in more local levels, and future research
should explore this possibility. Second, using the post-Cold War era as the initial point
may be missing possible complex relationships regarding the British Empire. For
example, the deindustrialization of the west and rise of the European Union (EU) in 1970
impacted the British Empire, which may have had lasting effects that are not considered
in the data. Similarly, 1945 marked the collapsing of the British Empire effectively
shifting world powers and trade across the globe. Finally, the research focuses only on
countries that share a common colonial history. Had other sets of countries been
considered, such as only countries that are part of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or only countries that had U.S. military presence in
the past 20 years, the results may have shifted due to major historical influences.

Conclusion
In conclusion, this thesis provides insight into the complex relationship between world
systems dynamics, hardships, and protests. Results find partial support of world systems
indicators and protests, indicating a need to take into account the positions countries hold
in the world-economy. While political opportunity explanations offer an important
contribution to social movement research, this thesis indicates hardships help to explain
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the rise of social unrest in an international context. These relationships, however, may not
be linear. It is possible that linear findings may not represent the data adequately, and due
to cases of perfect non-linearity, may lead researchers to commit a Type II error. Finally,
there is partial evidence that world systems dynamics work through hardships to effect
social unrest.
Regarding social movement research, the findings not only validate political
opportunity explanations as a cause for protests but that prior social movement theories
still hold utility in contemporary research. While windows of opportunity may allow for
unrest to foster, quality of life continues to act as a predictive factor. While not seeking to
challenge political opportunity explanations, social movement research will benefit by
understanding to what degree do relative deprivation concepts explain social unrest when
paired with political opportunity indicators. Similarly, focusing on direct relationships
only may have missed complex relationships between certain variables and social
movement activity.
Not only do social movement scholars benefit from this research, global
organizations and initiatives to reduce social unrest and increase quality of life benefit as
well. Understanding that protests occur due to collective dissent, these findings help
administrators and policy makers consider factors that may be indicative of increases in
social unrest that will help identify and suppress unrest levels. While increasing a
country’s engagement in the world economy may act as a small fix, initiatives to increase
employment rates and cut down on areas of overcrowding help to decrease the level of
social unrest. Considering the final results, future research might begin to explore other
facets of access to resources and raw materials to understand national-level unrest.
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Table 2: Pooled-Time Series Analysis of Protests: Linear Effects of World Systems Indicators, Hardships, and Controls a
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Urban Population2
-0.001 0.000 ***
Controls
Armed Forces Personnel b
2.012
0.309 ***
-0.219 0.490
0.325 0.539
2b
Armed Forces Personnel
-0.059
0.015 ***
0.016 0.019
0.019 0.026
Civil Violence
0.208
0.077 **
0.414 0.086 ***
0.098 0.097
Civil Violence2
-0.032
0.011 **
-0.053 0.011 ***
-0.015 0.013
Government Type
0.129
0.081
0.273 0.088 **
0.290 0.064 ***
2
Government Type
-0.002
0.003
-0.012 0.004 **
-0.011 0.003 ***
Constant
-11.232
1.544 ***
-1.589 6.590
9.803 8.229
N
315
R-Squared
0.507
0.615
0.681
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
a
The outcome variable, protests, has a constant added (1) and been logged to account for a non-normal distribution.
b
This variable has been logged to account for a non-normal distribution.

0.787

***

***
***

***
+

*
+
***
***

0.000 ***
-0.892 0.488
0.030 0.022
0.169 0.079
-0.018 0.009
0.611 0.064
-0.028 0.003
-17.214 10.652

-0.001

Table 3: Pooled-Time Series Analysis of Protests: Non-linear Effects of World-Systems Indicators, Hardships, and Controls a
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Coeff.
s.e.
Coeff.
s.e.
Coeff.
s.e.
Coeff.
s.e.
World Systems Indicators
GDP b
0.113 0.578
1.312 0.676
2b
GDP
0.011 0.012
-0.005 0.014
Terms of Trade
-0.063 0.011 ***
-0.025 0.009
2
Terms of Trade
0.000 0.000 ***
0.000 0.000
Hardships
Male Labor Force Participation
-0.359 0.197
0.023 0.169
Male Labor Force Participation2
0.002 0.001
0.000 0.001
Female Labor Force Participation
-0.029 0.023
-0.105 0.022
2
Female Labor Force Participation
0.001 0.000 ***
0.001 0.000
Adolescent Fertility Rate
0.012 0.011
0.009 0.010
Adolescent Fertility Rate2
0.000 0.000 ***
0.000 0.000
Urban Population
0.110 0.021 ***
0.062 0.019
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-0.030

Terms of Trade

-0.158
0.206
82.404

Civil Violence

Government Type

Constant

1.711 ***

0.121

0.209

0.400 ***

0.011 **

0.290 ***

33.579

-0.459

0.609

-8.521

-0.115

5.074

3.621 ***

0.220 *

0.402

0.914 ***

0.021 ***

0.686 ***

N
315
R-squared
0.157
0.476
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
a
This variable has been logged to account for a non-normal distribution.

1.872

Armed Forces Personnel a

Controls

-1.134

GDP a

World Systems Indicators

0.380

398.127

-0.491

0.958

6.174

0.038

-16.172

6.769 ***

0.527

0.922

1.886 ***

0.059

1.330 ***

0.564

-174.001

-1.515

-1.847

-10.389

-0.151

15.244

7.420 ***

0.261 ***

0.386 ***

1.134 ***

0.036 ***

0.987 ***

Table 4: Pooled-Time Series Analysis of Hardships: Effects of World-Systems Theory
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Male Labor Force
Female Labor Force
Adolescent Fertility
Urban Population
Participation
Participation
Rate
Coeff.
s.e.
Coeff.
s.e.
Coeff.
s.e.
Coeff.
s.e.
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model

Figure 2: Conceptual Map of Mediating Model
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Non-Linear Effects

Linear Effects of Female Labor Force Participation on Protests

Non-Linear Effects of Female Labor Force Participation on Protests
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Figure 3: Linear and Non-Linear Relationships of Female Labor Force Participation and
Government Type on Social Unrest
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